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M 
entality has proven extremely difficult to explain 
or account for in the sciences. By mentality, I mean 
the various capacities of reasoning, deduction, 
understanding, or other abilities that give rise to 
the kind of sophisticated interaction with the world that sets 
human beings and animals apart from all other living and non-
living things. This difficulty represents one of the central features 
of the mind-body problem. The purpose of this paper is to 
suggest the possibility of an empirical outcome that would allow 
for an adequate explanation of mentality and remain consistent 
with our scientific hypotheses about the physical world.  
 The outcome I wish to consider is that brains are 
indeterminate and perhaps chaotic systems. The nature of their 
physical material and extended interaction with the world may 
result in their behavior being such that it cannot be precisely 
captured by the laws of physical causation. In this case, it would 
be possible for the brain to exhibit emergent properties, namely 
properties that could not be predicted from precise knowledge of 
its physical structure. The emergence of these properties could 
provide a physical account for our conscious experience and 
mentality.  
 I also offer two corollaries to this position. First, if 
mentality is indeed accounted for by the emergence of properties 
in brains, then Searle‟s argument about the importance of the 
brain itself in generating mentality would seem to be right 
(Searle, 1980, reprinted in Rosenthal, pp 509-519). Mentality may 
not be as multiply realizable as previously thought. This would 
deprive functionalists of one of their primary arguments against 
identity theories. Second, this model would render ontological 
functionalism1 completely inadequate for describing the 
mentality of conscious entities. Functionalism is grounded in the 
idea that mentality consists of causal relations between inputs, 
machine states of the entity being described, and outputs. If it 
turns out that accounting for mentality requires a departure from 
the realm of normal causal relations, then functional accounts are 




Causality, Chaos, and Indeterminism 
 Causality has been the subject of intense debate in the 
history of philosophy. Hume is well known for having argued 
that events we habitually take to be causally related are only 
incidentally correlated, and such observations do not prove the 
existence of causal order. Kant thought causality could be 
deduced from a priori considerations, as a necessary condition for 
the possibility of experience. The question of whether or not the 
universe is governed by a universal causal order remains 
unresolved, and developments in quantum mechanics have 
further clouded the issue.   
 In his book, The Disorder Of Things, John Dupre describes 
four possible ways in which the universe might be causally 
ordered. First, there is the possibility of strict determinism. This 
describes a world completely and precisely governed by 
exceptionless causal laws such that the state of things at time T‟ 
can be exactly deduced from the state of things at time T. Second, 
there is what he calls probabilistic uniformitarianism. In this 
case, the world is still governed by universal causal laws, but 
laws under which the outcome at time T‟ can only be predicted 
in terms of probabilities which can be generated from the state of 
the world at time T.2 Third, there is probabilistic catastrophism. 
Here, the probabilities described in probabilistic 
uniformitarianism are not stable and inevitably disintegrate in 
bewildering complexity. The sheer plurality of possible causes 
and the indeterminability of their individual causal powers 
renders the precise generation of causal probabilities impossible. 
Thus, probabilistic causal laws do not actually exist, but can only 
be guessed or approximated. Finally, there is the lingering 
possibility of complete randomness, in which there is no causal 
connection between events whatsoever (Dupre, 172-173). 
 Neither strict determinism nor complete randomness are 
taken very seriously by the current scientific community. With 
the rise of quantum mechanics and string theory, probabilistic 
uniformitarianism seems to be the most mainstream view today. 
Dupre argues, however, for probabilistic catastrophism. To make 
his case, he first cites the fact that generating probabilistic causal 
accounts, especially in complex situations, faces insurmountable 
epistemological difficulties. Specifically, he brings up chaos 
theory, which deals with systems that are guided by relatively 
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deterministic mathematical functions, but functions that are 
indefinitely sensitive to exactness and alterations of certain 
variables. Thus, if realized physically, it would be impossible to 
measure such systems accurately enough to give a true account 
of the processes in motion. Meteorology is hypothesized to be an 
example of such a system, which would explain our failure in 
predicting the weather with much accuracy.3 If it is not possible 
for us to generate causal probabilities, Dupre argues, why think 
they exist4 (Dupre, 194-195)? 
 Dupre also makes general arguments against any sort of 
unamity thesis. This is the idea that all properties, phenomena, 
and laws in higher level sciences are derived from those in lower 
level sciences, and that a single overarching set of causal laws 
can be used to articulate all interactions taking place at all levels 
of complexity in the universe. Why then, he asks, do we 
encounter such heterogeneity in the types of phenomena and 
properties we encounter in the universe, heterogeneity which 
despite all our scientific efforts continues to resist reduction 
(Dupre, 203)? 
 While both of these arguments are central to the thesis of 
this paper, I do recognize that Dupre‟s claims are empirical ones, 
and ones which I am not qualified to evaluate in detail. Further 
scientific investigations may reveal them to be true or false, or 
may simply leave them unevaluated. However, I believe the 
conclusions reached by Dupre are plausible, and my task here is 
to examine their implications for the mind-body problem should 
we stipulate them.  So, my position may be stated as conditional: 
If probabilistic catastrophism is true, it has important 
consequences for the mind/body problem. 
 
Indeterminism and Emergentism 
 I turn now to a discussion of emergentism, a position that 
Jaegwon Kim summarizes in three tenets. 
 
1. All that exists in the spacetime world are the 
basic particles recognized in physics and their 
aggregates.... 
2. When aggregates of material particles attain an 
appropriate level of structural complexity, 
genuinely novel properties emerge to characterize 
these structured systems.... 
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3. Emergent properties are irreducible to, and 
unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena 
from which they emerge (Kim 227-228). 
Thus, emergentism is a type of non-reductive physicalism. When 
this doctrine is applied to the philosophy of mind, it is held that 
mentality is an emergent property of certain aggregate 
neurological constructions, namely brains. This property is a real 
and present feature of the world, but does not strictly reduce to 
more basic physical laws which govern the smaller parts 
comprising the brain. This sort of formulation allows 
consciousness to exist in the physical world without requiring 
that it be reducible. Hence, physicalism is combined with 
property dualism.  
 Emergentism faces a serious problem, however, which is 
that of downward causation. Emergentism takes emergent 
properties to be real and novel in themselves, not merely 
resultant from properties of lower level organizations of parts. 
Phenomena like mentality, once they emerge, seem to take on a 
life of their own.  However, the problem then arises that if these 
properties are genuinely real, they would presumably interact 
causally with the world like anything else. Indeed, our mental 
states and events, decisions, and actions do seem to interact with 
the physical world through the apparatus of our bodies.  My 
decision to lift my arm effects a change in the physical state of 
the world which is reflected at the level of elementary physics 
upward. Hence, these irreducible properties seem to interrupt 
the closed causal nexus that governs interactions at the more 
basic level, effectively subjecting it to the same objections that 
discredit Cartesian dualism (Kim 229-230). If the interactions at a 
certain levelare being influenced by interactions from another 
level (in Descartes‟ case, the mental and physical realms) how is 
this being done? By what mechanism? This is where Dupre‟s 
arguments become important. 
 Probabilistic catastrophism, unlike strict determinism or 
probabilistic uniformitarianism, does not specifically require a 
closed causal nexus governed by universal laws that determines 
outcomes or probabilities of outcomes. Without requiring the 
strict adherence to universal causal laws, it becomes possible for 
emergent properties to have downward causal powers without 
needing to be reducible. One could see the interaction of my 
consciousness with the world swinging the odds that a cataclysm 
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of events occurs in my neurological system, such that my arm 
moves. This type of interaction can be especially well articulated 
if the brain‟s functioning falls under the heading of any type of 
chaos theory, under which very minor alterations in isolated 
parts of the brain could produce large changes in overall 
outcomes. Now of course, it cannot be that the emergent 
properties cause particular outcomes that would have no chance 
whatsoever of occurring without the specific intervention. 
Emergentism has no problem with this caveat. Indeed, it would 
seem that the physical state of the brain and the specifics of the 
conscious experience must be closely related. Any theory in 
which this was not the case would fly directly in the face of 
overwhelming psychological and neurological evidence. It is 
certainly true that there are general rules of correlation extending 
between the emergent properties and the lower-level parts. The 
emergentist thesis is that these correlations are not explained by 
any set of reducible scientific laws. A universe governed by 
probabilistic catastrophism seems to make this possible.  
 
Functionalism and Multiple Realizability 
 Emergentism under such a scheme creates serious 
problems for any functionalist theory of mentality. 
Functionalism seems incompatible with it in three ways. First, 
part of the impetus for something like emergentism is to render 
an account of consciousness and qualitative experience, an 
intuitively major part of human mentality but one which 
functionalism conspicuously seems to avoid or attempts to 
explain away as non-existent. While in this paper I am focusing 
primarily on mentality, an account of mentality ought to be 
compatible with some account of consciousness and qualitative 
experience. Second, all functionalist accounts include a ceteris 
paribus clause which precludes structure-changing events from 
being counted as inputs. However, this clause seems to ignore a 
central aspect of the brain‟s extended existence, and thus 
functionalism falls short of giving a complete account of the 
mentality to which the brain gives rise. Finally, if we accept that 
universal causal laws do not exist, functionalism‟s basis for 
explanation seems ill-founded, making it at best an 
approximation.  
 The first incompatibility is, for the most part, self-
explanatory. Nagel‟s well-known article, “What‟s It Like To Be A 
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Bat?” (1974, reprinted in Rosenthal, pp 422-428) crystallized the 
problems with ignoring the first-person phenomenological 
experiences that comprise consciousness. Functionalism 
describes human beings as machines, and while providing 
algorithms for behavior, the machine-state paradigm offers no 
explanation for the qualitative experience of tasting chocolate, or 
how it feels to find one‟s way with bat sonar. Clearly, a complete 
picture of mentality should make some provision for such 
considerations. 
 The second incompatibility shows a way in which a 
functional account starkly contrasts with the functioning of 
actual brains. In order to allow the state-tables conceived in a 
functional model to be ontologically accurate, the functionalist 
must include a ceteris paribus clause so that very abnormal or 
structure-altering events (piercing of the cranium) are not 
counted as inputs.5 
However, I contend that constant structural changes in 
the brain are neither abnormal, nor should they be excluded as 
important elements in understanding mentality. The brain is an 
incredibly complex system, consisting of billions of neurons, 
constantly taking in nutrients, forming new pathways, removing 
dead cells, and generally responding to its non-neurological 
interactions with the world (interactions that do not occur 
directly by way of incoming or outgoing nervous signals). Under 
the emergentist model, it seems likely that this ability to evolve 
and be in a state of constant structural flux plays some part in the 
emergence of mental properties. Hence, a functionalist model 
specifically lacks the dynamism that could be a crucial ingredient 
in mentality. While functionalism is indeed useful in making 
broader generalizations and seeming to uncover regularities, I 
state again that its determinations are too vague to account truly 
for the processes actually at work.  
 Finally and most importantly, functionalism bases 
mentality in the causal relations between inputs, machine-states, 
and outputs. The state-tables that articulate these relations either 
describe them either as deterministic (given state S and input I, 
output O and go to S‟), or as probabilistic (given state S and 
input I, x% chance to output O and go to S‟ and y% chance to 
output O* and go to S*) (Putnam, 1967, reprinted in Rosenthal, 
pp. 197-203). However, this relies on universal laws that are 
either strictly deterministic or probabilistically uniformitarian. 
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The type of emergentism I am describing does not conform to 
either type of laws, and thus a functionalist account that uses 
them does so on false grounds. 
 The emergentist thesis, combined with probabilistic 
catastrophism, leaves the question open as to whether or not 
mentality can be multiply realized. The thesis does, however, 
make it an empirical question, not a necessary condition. Using 
his famous Chinese room example, John Searle argued that the 
mere ability to mimic and provide appropriate output (given an 
input) does not amount to understanding or mentality. In 
“Minds, Brains, and Programs”, Searle states, “My own view is 
that only a machine could think, and indeed only very special 
kinds of machines, namely brains and machines that had the 
same causal powers as brains,” (1980, reprinted in Rosenthal, pg 
519). It is unclear what it would mean to have the same causal 
powers as brains under the emergentist thesis. The irreducibility 
of the relation between the brain and mentality makes it difficult 
to evaluate what other types of systems might spawn the 
emergence of mental properties. It is certainly possible that 
mentality only emerges from brainy substances, in which case it 
would not be multiply realizable. On the other hand, mentality 
could appear in a system or medium very different from a brain, 
but it would be difficult to know whether or not this was the 
case. Our assignment of mentality to entities in the world is 
based primarily on behavioral observations, and thus a non-
brainy system that had mental properties but did not behave in 
customary ways would be very hard to recognize. In any case, 
the question becomes one for science. 
 
Notes 
1 It is important to distinguish between instrumental and ontological 
functionalism here. Instrumentalist functionalism only offers functional models 
as a useful tool in understanding mentality (something along the lines of what 
Daniel Dennett might suggest (Dennett, 1975, reprinted in Rosenthal, pp. 339-
350), whereas ontological functionalism holds that mental states and functional 
states are identical, and thus functionalism captures the whole of mentality.  
2 Probabilistic uniformitarianism can be read to be either reductionist, or anti-
reductionist. That is, it could be that the probabilistic laws operating at the 
various levels of organization are ultimately derivable from the laws operating 
at the most basic level (physics). On the other hand, it may be that the laws are 
not derivable, yielding an anti-reductionist theory. Dupre seems to peg most 
scientists as subscribers to something resembling the former interpretation 
(Dupre, 172), though either account seems plausible.  
3 One might say, however, that while meteorology does seem at times to be 
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chaotic and impenetrable, this does not mean that all science is like this, for we 
do frequently seem to observe isolated uniformities under the right conditions, 
such as the results of elementary chemistry experiments. I offer two responses. 
First, it does not follow that because probabilities in situations are ultimately 
indeterminate means they can not approximate out to something extremely 
high (approaching deterministic certainty). Second, it may be that in many 
cases where we take causal relations to be uniform, abnormalities are occurring, 
and either our observational apparatus and precision of classification are not 
adequately sensitive to them, or they are simply being written off as tainted 
experimental data. In both cases, we would be simply interpreting what we 
observe to be uniform when in fact it is not. 
4 The condition Dupre is speaking of is, on its face, an epistemological one. 
Dupre suggests that so far we have been unable to pin down strict causal laws, 
and given this difficulty, concludes that we have every reason to suspect that 
they do not exist at all, a metaphysical argument. Clearly, the thesis of this 
paper depends heavily on this indeed being a metaphysical condition, and not 
just an epistemic one. 
5 This is a criticism not exclusively applicable to functionalism, but to all 
sciences in general. Traditional laws of biology and chemistry begin to break 
down when extraordinary circumstances are presented (such as being in close 
proximity to a black hole). 
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